Fordham International Law Journal
Volume 25, Issue 1

2001

Article 2

Was Genocide Committed in Bosnia and
Herzegovina? First Judgments of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia
William A. Schabas∗

∗

Copyright c 2001 by the authors. Fordham International Law Journal is produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj

Was Genocide Committed in Bosnia and
Herzegovina? First Judgments of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia
William A. Schabas

Abstract
There are to date some six significant judicial pronouncements dealing with the interpretation and application of article 4–genocide - of the ICTY Statute: two Rule 61 hearings; the Trial
Chamber rulings in Jelisic, Krstic, and Sikirica; and the Appeals Chamber decision in Jelisic. In
the course of these judgments, the ICTY has made important pronouncements about the actus reus
of genocide, the nature of the protected groups, the quantitative dimension of the crime, and the
concept of intent.
It is now nearly a decade since international justice began examining whether genocide was committed in Bosnia. Astonishingly, the really big question-and the most interesting one from a political and historical standpoint-still remains unanswered, namely whether there was an organized
plan or policy on the part of the Bosnian Serb leadership, with the complicity of the Belgrade
regime, to destroy the Bosnian Muslims within the meaning of article II of the Convention. The
ICJ, seized of the matter in March 1993, has yet to adjudicate the question on the merits.
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INTRODUCTION
When the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia ("ICTY") was established by the Security Council in
May of 1993,' it held the promise of being the first international
tribunal to prosecute the crime of genocide. Back in 1948, the
United Nations General Assembly had experienced considerable
difficulty determining the appropriate jurisdiction for genocide
prosecutions as it was drafting the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide ("Convention").2 After rejecting recognition of universal jurisdiction,3 the
drafters settled on a minimal formula allowing for territorial jurisdiction but holding out the prospect of a yet-to-be-established
international criminal court. According to article VI of the Convention:
"[p]ersons charged with genocide or any of the other acts
enumerated in article III shall be tried by a competent tribu* Professor of Human Rights Law, National University of Ireland, Galway and Director, Irish Centre for Human Rights.
1. Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible
for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory
of the former Yugoslavia since 1991, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), annex [hereinafter
Statute]. For the preparatory documents, see VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF,
AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YuGOsLAvtA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY AND ANALYSIS (1995); M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI & PETER
MANIKAS, THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGO-

(1996).
2. Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec.
9, 1948, G.A. Res. 260A (III), U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), 78 U.N.T.S. 277
(entered into force Jan. 12, 1951) [hereinafter Convention].
3. In the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, in 1948, Iran proposed the
following amendment to the draft convention: "Add a paragraph: 'They may also be
tried by tribunals other than those of the States in the territories of which the act was
committed, if they have been arrested by the authorities of such States, and provided no
request has been made for their extradition.'" U.N. Doc. A/C.6/218. The amendment
was rejected by twenty-nine votes to six, with ten abstentions. U.N. GAOR, 100th mtg.,
U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.100 (1948).
sLAVtA
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nal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall
have accepted its jurisdiction."4
Efforts to create such an international tribunal were launched
immediately by the General Assembly, 5 but nothing substantial
came of them for more than four decades. 6 In late 1992, international organizations began to make charges that genocide was
being committed in the ongoing conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina.7 An application to the International Court of Justice
("ICJ") filed by Bosnia and Herzegovina in early 1993 relied on
article XI of the 1948 Convention, and focused still more attention on the claim that genocide was being committed. The provisional measures ordered by the Court, on April 8, 1993,
seemed to confirm the credibility of the charge. 8 A few days
later, in a resolution referring to the ICJ order, the Security
Council used the word "genocide" for the first time in its history. 9 And of course, popular journalistic accounts repeatedly
described the ongoing atrocities in Bosnia and Herzegovina as
4. Convention, supra note 2, art. VI. On the Convention, see generally WILLIAM A.
SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

(2000).

5. The General Assembly called on the International Law Commission "to study
the desirability and possibility of establishing an international judicial organ for the
trial of persons charged with genocide or other crimes over which jurisdiction will be
conferred upon that organ by international conventions." G.A. Res. 260B (III), U.N.
GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
6. See generally M. Cherif Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-Five Years:
The Need to Establish a Permanent InternationalCriminal Court, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 11
(1997).
7. See Interim Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuantto Security Council

Resolution 780 (1992), U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/25274, paras. 55-56 (1993) [hereinafter
Interim Report]; The Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, U.N. GAOR, 91st plen. mtg.,

U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/121 (1992).
8. See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bos. & Herz. v. Yugoslavia (Serb. & Mont.)), Requests for the Indication of Provisional Measures, 1993 I.C.J. 3, 16 (Apr. 8, 1993) [hereinafter Application]; see also Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Les ordonnancesen indication de mesures
conservatoires dans l'affaire relative d l'application de la convention pour la prvention et la

repression du crime de genocide, 39

ANNUAIRE FRANCAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL

514

(1993); Christine Gray, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)), 43 INT'L
& CoMp. L.Q. 704 (1994); Rafaflle Maison, Les ordonnances de la Cour internationalede
justice dans l'affaire relative d I'application de la Convention pour la preention et la r pression
du crime deg6nocide, 3 EUR.J. INT'L L. 381 (1994).

9. See S.C. Res. 819, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3199th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/
819 (1993).
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genocide.1 °
Although the Security Council Resolution did not explicitly
identify it as the body contemplated by article VI of the 1948
Convention, when the ICTY was established on May 8, 1993 the
Tribunal was given explicit jurisdiction over the crime of genocide in article 4 of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia ("Statute")." The definition set
out in article 4 essentially reproduced the text of articles II and
III of the 1948 Convention. 12 But it soon became rather clear
that the focus of the ICTY would be upon the other two categories of crimes within its subject matter jurisdiction, namely war
crimes and crimes against humanity. The initial indictments
were extremely parsimonious in making accusations of genocide. The Prosecutor was quite obviously hesitant to present indictments for genocide in the former Yugoslavia, in marked contrast to his policy with respect to indictments before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ("ICTR").
The
Prosecutor's caution in preferring accusations of genocide became manifest in the very first case to actually come to trial. After Dusko Tadic was arrested in Germany, national courts proceeded against him for aiding and abetting genocide, as well as
torture, murder, and causing grievous bodily harm.14 Although
Tadic was only a minor player in Bosnian war crimes, the youthful International Tribunal was hungry for work and jumped at
the chance to preempt the German courts. 5 But the Prosecutor
10. See generally Roy GUTMAN, A WITNESS TO GENOCIDE (1993); MICHAEL A. SELLS,
THE BRIDGE BETRAYED, RELIGION AND GENOCIDE IN BOSNIA (1996); BEVERLY ALLEN, RAPE
WARFARE: THE HIDDEN GENOCIDE IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA AND CROATIA (1996); NORTHE POLICY OF "ETHNIC CLEANSING" IN EASTERN EuROPE (1995); FRANCIS A. BOYLE, THE BOSNIAN PEOPLE CHARGE GENOCIDE (1996).
MAN CIGAR, GENOCIDE IN BOSNIA:

11. See Statute, supra note 1, art. 4(1).
12. Compare id. art. 4(2), with Convention, supra note 2, arts. II, III.
13. Statute of International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian
Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for genocide and other such violations committed in the territory of neighboring states, between January 1, 1994 and December 31, 1994, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), annex
[hereinafter ICTR]. Pursuant to article 15(3) of the ICTR Statute, the Prosecutor of
the ICTY also acts as Prosecutor for the ICTR.
14. See MICHAEL SCHARF, BALKAN JUSTICE 97 (1997); Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case no.

IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, para. 7 (May 7, 1997). Decisions of the ICTY are
available at http://www.un.org/icty/index.html.
15. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case no. IT-94-1-1, Application for a Formal Request
for Deferral (Nov. 8, 1994).
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confined his indictment to war crimes and crimes against humanity, abandoning the charge of genocide. 16 "We were amazed
that Germany had no specific evidence on that charge," said
Deputy Prosecutor Graham Blewitt. v "They were going to attempt to prove it solely on the basis of the testimony of an expert
witness. But we thought it would be difficult to establish genocide with respect to Tadic." 8
Then, the Tribunal's judges sent some encouraging signals
to the Prosecutor in two decisions issued pursuant to Rule 61 of
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 9 The Rule 61 hearing
procedure was used in the early years of the ICTY, at a time
when judges were starved for trial work. More recently, the Prosecutor has shown no further interest in the mechanism, which
was largely designed to allay complaints from continental jurists
about the absence of in absentia proceedings.2" Essentially, the
Prosecutor presents evidence allowing a Trial Chamber to rule
on whether it "is satisfied on that evidence, together with such
additional evidence as the Prosecutor may tender, that there are
reasonable grounds for believing that the accused has committed all or any of the crimes charged in the indictment."2 1 In the
16. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case no. IT-94-1-I, Indictments (Dec. 14, 1995).
17. SCHARF, supra note 14, at 101.
18. See id.; see also Michael P. Scharf, The Prosecutorv. Dusko Tadic: An Appraisal of
the First InternationalWar Crimes Trial Since Nuremberg, 60 ALB. L. REV. 861 (1997); Raymond M. Brown, Trial of the Century? Assessing the Case of Dusko Tadic Before the International Criminal Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia, 3 ILSAJ. INT'L & COMp. L. 613 (1997).
19. See Prosecutor v. Nikolic, Case no. IT-95-2-R61, Review of Indictment Pursuant
to Rule 61 (Oct. 20, 1995); Prosecutor v. Karadzic, Case nos. IT-95-5-R61, IT-95-18-R61,
Consideration of the Indictment within the Framework of Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (July 11, 1996). For the text of Rule 61, see Rules of Procedure
and Evidence, International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of
the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, Rule 61, U.N. Doc. IT/32/REV.21 (2001) [hereinafter Rules]. The Rules were adopted on February 11, 1994 and have been periodically
amended. The most recent version of the Rules can be found at http://www.un.org/
icty/basic/rpe/IT32_rev21con.htm.
20. On the Rule 61 procedure, see generally B.T. Hildreh, Hunting the Hunters:
The United Nations Unleashes its Latest Weapon in the Fight Against Fugitive War Crimes Suspects-Rule 61, 6 TUL. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 499 (1998); Faiza Patel King, PublicDisclosure
in Rule 61 ProceedingsBefore the InternationalCriminal Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia, 29
N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 523 (1997); Anne L. Quintal, Rule 61: The "Voice of the Victims"
Screams Outfor Justice, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 723 (1998); M. Thieroof & E.A. Amley, Proceedingto Justice and Accountability in the Balkans: The InternationalCriminal Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia and Rule 61, 23 YALE J. INT'L L. 231 (1998).
21. Rules, supra note 19, Rule 61(C).
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October 1995 Rule 61 hearing in Prosecutorv. Nikolic, the judges
invited the Prosecutor to add an indictment of genocide after
hearing evidence of ethnic cleansing, a suggestion that was never
22
taken up.
A year later, a Trial Chamber issued a Rule 61 order confirming one of the rare genocide indictments, that of Bosnian
Serb leaders Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic. 2 ' The Prosecutor offered evidence showing that the pair hoped to drive
Muslim and Croat populations from previously mixed areas in
order to create an "ethnically cleansed" Serb region in Bosnia
and Herzegovina. The Tribunal took the view that individual
criminal responsibility for genocide had been established.2 4
Turning to the detention camps, the Trial Chamber said:
The Trial Chamber is of the view that the evidence and testimony submitted suffice at this stage to demonstrate the active
participation of the highest political and military leaders in
the commission of the crimes by Bosnian Serb military and
police forces in the detention facilities. The uniform methods used in committing the said crimes, their pattern, their
pervasiveness throughout all of the Bosnian Serb-held territory, the movements of prisoners between the various camps,
and the tenor of some of the accused's statements are strong
indications tending to show that Radovan Karadzic and Ratko
Mladic planned, ordered or otherwise aided and abetted in
the planning, preparation or execution of the genocide perpetrated in the detention facilities.25
The Tribunal also considered that liability had been established
on the basis of command responsibility. 26 Clearly disappointed
by the Prosecutor's conservatism in charging genocide only with
respect to the conditions in the detention camps, the Trial
Chamber noted that the evidence revealed a pattern of genocidal acts targeting "[t]he national Bosnian, Bosnian Croat and,
22. See Nikolic, Case no. IT-95-2-R61, para. 34; see also Faiza Patel King & AnneMarie La Rosa, The Jurisprudenceof the Yugoslavia Tribunal: 1994-1996, 8 EUR.J. INT'L L.
123, 130-32 (1997); RafailIle Maison, La decision de la Chambre d.e premigre instance no 1 du
7ibunalpnal internationalpour l'ex-Yougoslavie dans l'affaireNicolic, 7 EUR.J. INT'L L. 284
(1996). For the indictment in Nikolic, see Prosecutor v. Nikolic, Case no. IT-94-2-I, Indictment (Nov. 4, 1994).
23. Karadzic, Case nos. IT-95-5-R61, IT-95-18-R61.
24. See id.
25. Id. para. 84.
26. See id.
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especially, Bosnian Muslim national groups," inviting the Prosecutor "to consider broadening the scope of the characterization
of genocide to include criminal acts listed in the first indictment
other than those committed in the detention camps."27
By early 1999, some six years after the establishment of the
ICTY, only eight suspects-of more than seventy public indictments-had been accused of genocide. 28 To the great surprise
of many observers, Yugoslav president Slobodan Milosevic was
charged with crimes against humanity but not genocide with respect to persecution of Kosovar Albanians during the first
months of 1999.29 After Milosevic finally appeared before the
ICTY, in July 2001, the Prosecutor pledged to issue a new indictment dealing with events in Croatia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina, declaring that genocide would probably figure among the
charges. Nevertheless, the indictment issued in October 2001,
with respect to the conflict in Croatia, did not charge genocide. o
The first judgment of the ICTY in a genocide case was issued in October 1999. 3 1 Goran Jelisic, a "low-level" thug driven
by hatred of Muslims, was personally responsible for the murder
of several dozen victims in concentration camps in the Brcko region of northwest Bosnia and Herzegovina. After indictment
and arrest, Jelisic agreed to plead guilty to counts of war crimes
and crimes against humanity, but denied responsibility for genocide. The Prosecutor decided, nevertheless, that a trial should
proceed in search of a conviction for genocide. She may have
27. Id. paras. 84, 94-95.
28. See Prosecutor v. Karadzic, Case nos. IT-95-5-I, IT-95-18-I, Indictments (July 24,
1995 & Nov. 16, 1995); Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Case no. IT-95-10-1, Indictments (July 21,
1995, May 12, 1998 & Oct. 19, 1998); Prosecutor v. Meakic, Case no. IT-95-4-I, Indictments (Feb. 13, 1995 & June 2, 1998); Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case no. IT-98-33-I, Indictment (Nov. 2, 1998); Prosecutor v. Kovacevic, Case no. IT-97-24-I, Indictments (Mar. 13,
1997 &June 23, 1998); Prosecutor v. Sikirica, Case no. IT-95-8-I, Indictment (July 21,
1995).
29. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case no. IT-99-37-I, Indictment (May 24, 1999). Note
also that the Supreme Court of Kosovo recently overturned a genocide conviction. See
Kosovo's Top Legal Body Overturns Genocide Conviction, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE ENG. WIRE,

Sept. 6, 2001. The Supreme Court of Kosovo stated that "'[t]he exactions committed
by (former Yugoslav president Slobodan) Milosevic's regime cannot be qualified as
criminal acts of genocide, since their purpose was not the destruction of the Albanian
ethnic group ... but its forceful departure from Kosovo."' Id.
30. See Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case no. IT-01-50-I, Indictment (Oct. 8, 2001).
31. See Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Case no. IT-95-10-T,Judgment (Oct. 19, 1999).
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viewed Jelisic as a "test case" that could guide future prosecutions
of genocide. But during the hearing, after she had announced
that all of her evidence had been led, the Trial Chamber announced that it would enter an acquittal on the charge of genocide. A summary judgment was issued at the time, on October
19, 1999,32 followed two months later by more substantial written
reasons, on December 14, 1999." 3
The peremptory manner in which the Trial Chamber dismissed the genocide indictment infuriated the Prosecutor, who
charged that judgment had been rendered without her having a
chance to be properly heard. In a July 2001 ruling, the Appeals
Chamber held that the Trial Chamber ought to have allowed the
case to proceed, given that there was sufficient evidence for the
defense to rebut.3 4 Nevertheless, the Chamber felt that returning the case for hearing before the Trial Chamber, or for rehearing before another Trial Chamber, would not be in the interests of justice.3" Although it sustained the grievance of the
Prosecutor, Jelisic's acquittal for genocide was allowed to
stand.36 The judges of the Appeals Chamber seemed to echo the
dissatisfaction of the Trial Chamber at the Prosecutor's stubborn
insistence upon a genocide indictment in a case where the accused had pleaded guilty to crimes against humanity. Indeed,
for this "lesser" offence, Jelisic was sentenced to forty years in
detention, one of the stiffest sentences ever imposed.
Then, in September 2001, in another case dealing with persecution in concentration camps, the Trial Chamber granted a
defense motion to dismiss, this time after the Prosecution's evidence had been heard.3 8 Within a few days of the dismissal of
the genocide charge, Sikirica agreed to plead guilty to a charge
of crimes against humanity.
In the midst of these two failures to obtain genocide convictions, the Prosecutor scored an impressive triumph in August
2001 when a Trial Chamber convicted General Radislav Krstic of
32. See id.
33. Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Case no. IT-95-10-T, Judgment (Dec. 14, 1999).
34. See Prosecutor v.Jelisic, Case no. IT-95-10-A, Judgment, para. 57 (July 5, 2001).
35. See id. para. 77.
36. See id.
37. SeeJelisic, Case no. IT-95-10-T, Judgment, para. 139 (Dec. 14, 1999).
38. See Prosecutor v. Sikirica, Case no. IT-95-8-T, Judgment on Defence Motions to
Acquit (Sept. 3, 2001).
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genocide for the massacre of more than 7,000 male Bosnian
Muslims in Srebrenica in July 1995." 9 According to the Tribunal,
the Srebrenica events "defy description in their horror and their
implications for humankind's capacity to revert to acts of brutality under the stresses of conflict."4 Though not the principal
commander of the Bosnian Serb armies, Krstic had played a role
in the massacre. The first accused to be convicted of genocide
by the ICTY, he was condemned to its most severe sentence to
date, forty-six years imprisonment,4 1 an indication that like its
sister Tribunal in Arusha, the ICTY considers genocide to be the
"crime of crimes."4 2
Thus, there are to date some six significant judicial pronouncements dealing with the interpretation and application of
article 4-genocide-of the ICTY Statute: two Rule 61 hearings;
the Trial Chamber rulings in Jelisic, Krstic, and Sikirica; and the
Appeals Chamber decision in Jelisic. In the course of these judgments, the ICTY has made important pronouncements about
the actus reus of genocide, the nature of the protected groups,
the quantitative dimension of the crime, and the concept of intent.

I. ACTUS REUS OF GENOCIDE: IS A PLAN REQUIRED?
In Jelisic, the Prosecution's evidence indicated that over a
two-week period the accused was the principal executioner in
the Luka camp. He was shown to have systematically killed Muslim inmates, as well as some Croats. The main victims were Muslim community leaders. Jelisic was charged as both an accomplice and as a principal perpetrator.43 Examining the evidence,
the Trial Chamber, presided over by Judge Claude Jorda, concluded that the Prosecutor had failed to prove the existence of
any general or even regional plan to destroy in whole or in part
the Bosnian Muslims.4 4 The Trial Chamber said that Jelisic
could in no way be an accomplice to genocide if in fact genocide
39.
40.
41.
42.
para. 16
43.
44.

See Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case no. IT-98-33-T, Judgment (Aug. 2, 2001).
Id. para. 2.
See id. para. 726.
Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case no. ICTR-97-23-S, Judgment and Sentence,
(Sept. 4, 1998). Decisions of the ICTR are available at http://www.ictr.org.
Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Case no. IT-95-10-T, Judgment, para. 3 (Dec. 14, 1999).
See id.para. 98.

2001]

FIRST JUDGMENTS OF THE ICTY

was never committed by others. 45 On this point, it said the Prosecutor had simply failed to prove the perpetration of genocide
in Bosnia in the sense of some planned or organized attack on
the Muslim population. 46
Dismissing the charge of complicity, the Trial Chamber proceeded to consider whether or notJelisic could have committed
genocide acting alone, as the principal perpetrator, rather than
as an accomplice. 4 7 This might be called the "Lee Harvey Oswald theory of genocide." Ultimately, Jelisic was acquitted as a
principal perpetrator as well.4 8 But the Trial Chamber's approach is authority for the proposition that genocide may be
committed without any requirement of an organized plan or policy of a State or similar entity. According to the Trial Chamber:
Such a case is theoretically possible. The murders committed
by the accused are sufficient to establish the material element
of the crime of genocide and it is a priori possible to conceive
that the accused harboured the plan to exterminate an entire
group without this intent having been supported by any organisation in which other individuals participated. In this respect, the preparatory work of the Convention of 1948 brings
out that premeditation was not selected as a legal ingredient
of the crime of genocide, after having been mentioned by the
ad hoc committee at the draft stage, on the grounds that it
seemed superfluous given the special intention already required by the text and that such precision would only make
the burden of proof even greater. It ensues from this omission that the drafters of the Convention did not deem the
existence of an organisation or a system serving a genocidal
objective as a legal ingredient of the crime. In so doing, they
did not discount the possibility of a lone individual seeking to
destroy a group as such.4 9
The Trial Chamber's conclusion was upheld by the Appeals
Chamber:
The Appeals Chamber is of the opinion that the existence of
a plan or policy is not a legal ingredient of the crime. However, in the context of proving specific intent, the existence
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

See id.
See id.
See id. para. 99.
See id. para. 108.
Id. para. 100.
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of a plan or policy may become an important factor in most
cases. The evidence may be consistent with the existence of a
plan or policy, or may even show such existence, and the exis50
tence of a plan or policy may facilitate proof of the crime.
Certainly, nothing in the text of the definition of genocide
explicitly identifies a plan or policy as an element of the crime of
genocide.5 1 During drafting of the Convention in 1948, proposals to include an explicit requirement that genocide be planned
by the government were rejected. 52 Nevertheless, while exceptions cannot be ruled out, it is nearly impossible to imagine genocide that is not planned and organized either by the State itself or by some clique associated with it. Raphael Lemkin, the
scholar who first proposed the concept of "genocide" in his book
Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, spoke regularly of a plan as if this
was a sine qua non for the crime of genocide. 53 In Prosecutor v.
Kayishema, the Rwanda Tribunal wrote: "although a specific plan
to destroy does not constitute an element of genocide, it would
appear that it is not easy to carry out a genocide without a plan,
or organization. '54 Furthermore, the Rwanda Tribunal said that
"the existence of such a plan would be strong evidence of the
specific intent requirement for the crime of genocide. '' 55 The
Guatemalan Truth Commission, which examined charges of genocide with respect to atrocities committed during that country's civil war in the early 1980s, considered it necessary to
demonstrate the existence of a plan to exterminate Mayan communities that "obeyed a higher, strategically planned policy,
manifested in actions that had a logical and coherent sequence.'56
Other authorities have considered this issue in the context
50. Jelisic, Case no. IT-95-10-A, para. 48. The Appeals Chamber's obiter dictum was
followed in Prosecutorv. Sikirica, Case no. IT-95-8-I, Judgment on Defence Motions to

Acquit, para. 62 (Aug. 3, 2001).
51. See Statute, supra note 1, art. 4(2).
52. See U.N. Doc. E/AC.25/SR.4, at 3-6 (1948); see also Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d
232 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1005 (1996).
53. See RAPHAEL LEMKIN, Axis RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE, LAWS OF OCCUPATION,
ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT, PROPOSALS FOR REDRESS

79 (1944).

54. Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case no. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, para. 94 (May 21,
1999).
55. Id. para. 276.
56. Conclusions, Guatemala: Memory of Silence, Report of the Commission for Historical
Clarification, Conclusions and Recommendations, para. 120, available at http://hrdata.aaas.
org/ceh/report/english/toc.html.
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of discussion of the mental element, holding that the plan or
circumstances of genocide must be known to the offender,
thereby implicitly confirming that a plan or policy is a material
element of the crime. 5" In Attorney Gen. v. Eichmann, the Israeli
district court in Jerusalem found that Eichmann knew of the "secret of the plan for extermination" only since June 1941, and
acquitted him of genocide prior to that date.5 8 According to the
commentary of the International Law Commission on its Draft
Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind:
The extent of knowledge of the details of a plan or a policy to
carry out the crime of genocide would vary depending on the
position of the perpetrator in the governmental hierarchy or
the military command structure. This does not mean that a
subordinate who actually carries out the plan or policy cannot
be held responsible for the crime of genocide simply because
he did not possess the same degree of information concerning the overall plan or policy as his superiors. The definition
of the crime of genocide requires a degree of knowledge of
the ultimate objective of the criminal conduct rather than
knowledge of every detail of a comprehensive plan or policy
of genocide.59
Although individual offenders need not participate in devising
the plan, if they commit acts of genocide with knowledge of the
60
plan, then the requirements of the Convention are met.

The draft Elements of Crimes ("Elements") was adopted by
the Preparatory Commission of the International Criminal Court
in June 2000.61 An element of the crime of genocide in the draft
requires that "[t] he conduct took place in the context of a mani57. See e.g.,
Attorney Gen. v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 18 (D.C. Jm. 1968) (Israel).
58. See id. para. 195.
59. Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Eighth Session, May 6-July 26, 1996, U.N.
GAOR, 51st sess., U.N. Doc. A/51/10, art. 17 Commentary 10 (1996) [hereinafter Commission Report].
60. See e.g., Proposal by Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan, Iraq,
Kuwait, Lebanon, Libyan ArabJamahiriya, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen,
Comments on the proposal submitted by the United States of America concerning terminology and the crime of genocide, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/1999/WGEC/DP.4, at 4
(1999).
61. See Report of the Preparatory Commission for the InternationalCriminal Court, Addendum, Finalized draft text of the Elements of Crimes, U.N.. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2
(2000), available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/elements/elemfra.htm [hereinafter Elements].

34

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 25:23

fest pattern of similar conduct directed against that group or was
conduct that could itself effect such destruction."6 2 This is what
the Elements deem to be "contextual circumstances, '6 3 to distinguish such facts from the classic criminal law concept of material
element or actus reus. The term "circumstance" appears in article 30 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
("Rome Statute"), requiring as a component of the mens rea of
crimes that an accused have "awareness that a circumstance exists."6 4 Three additional provisions appear in the Elements that
complete but also complicate the construction of this somewhat
puzzling text about genocidal conduct. The term "in the context of" includes the initial acts in an emerging pattern, the term
"manifest" is deemed an objective qualification, and:
Notwithstanding the normal requirement for a mental element provided for in article 30 [of the Rome Statute], and
recognizing that knowledge of the circumstances will usually
be addressed in proving genocidal intent, the appropriate requirement, if any, for a mental element regarding this circumstance will need to be decided by the Court on a case-bycase basis.6 5
The Elements eschew the word "plan" in favor of a "manifest
pattern of similar conduct," 66 but any difference between the
two expressions appears to be entirely semantic. Alternatively,
the context may be "conduct that could itself effect such destruction."6 7 These criteria should be enough to eliminate the Lee
Harvey Oswald scenario.
The Office of the Prosecutor of the ad hoc tribunals has addressed the issue stating that "proof of the objective context in
which genocidal acts are committed with requisite intent is an
integral part of the proof of a genocide case. ' 6 ' However, the
Prosecutor has quarrelled vigorously with any suggestion that
the existence of a plan is an "element" of the crime. The Prose62. Id. at 6.
63. Id. at 5; see WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (2001).
64. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9,
art. 30(3) (1998), available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/99_corr/3.htm.
65. Elements, supra note 61, at 6.
66. See id.
67. Id.
68. Prosecutor v.Jelisic, Case no. IT-95-10-A, Prosecution's Appeal Brief (Redacted
Version), para. 64 (July 14, 2000).
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cutor has argued that the existence of a plan is not an "element,"
but an "integral part" of proof of a case. Perhaps the Prosecutor
prefers to reserve the term "element" for the actus reus and mens
rea, but to admit a requirement that proof also be made of "context" as an "integral part." This distinction may not always be
easy to understand. The Office of the Prosecutor has contended
that the "objective context"-or what the Elements call the
"manifest pattern of similar conduct"-may be limited to "persecution" as it is contemplated by the crimes against humanity provisions. This is a refinement on the Lee Harvey Oswald scenario,
because the lone g~nocidaireno longer operates in isolation, but
rather within a context of widespread or systematic persecution
that nevertheless falls short of genocide.
Thus, there seems to be little argument with the notion that
context is an implied element in the definition of genocide.
The debate is apparently about the scale of such "context," with
the Office of the Prosecutor, and no doubt some interpreters of
the draft Elements, contending that the plan or pattern need
only be one of widespread or systematic persecution on racial or
ethnic grounds (a "crimes against humanity policy") 69 rather
than one of intentional destruction of a racial or ethnic group (a
"genocidal policy"). On this issue, judges are confronted with
what is essentially a policy determination, because the words of
the Convention definition of genocide can evidently bear either
approach. Requiring evidence of a plan or policy ensures a
more appropriate stigmatization of the crime of genocide. The
ICTY's role is to contribute to peace, accountability, and ultimately reconciliation within a context of collective atrocity. Directing its fire at what are really no more than isolated social
deviants can only distort the historical record in an unnecessarily
provocative fashion. If Serb militias did not, in a collective sense,
commit genocide during the Bosnian war, such genocide convictions may not assist the Tribunal in its restorative function and
may ultimately prove to be counterproductive. But even assuming that there is no requirement of proof of genocidal context, a
responsible international prosecutor, conscious of the need to
focus precious resources on genuinely significant cases, ought to
69. According to the Trial Chamber of the ICTY, "a policy must exist to commit
[crimes against humanity], although it need not be the policy of a State." Prosecutor v.
Tadic, Case no. IT-94-1-T, Opinion andJudgment, para. 655 (May 7, 1997).
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discourage prosecution of individual maniacs who seem to possess preposterous and unrealistic genocidal plans that are not
shared by others. When a prosecutor fails in this task, judges
may express their dissatisfaction, as they did in Jelisic.7 °
II. PROTECTED GROUPS
Article 4 of the ICTY Statute says that genocide consists of
the intentional destruction of a "national, ethnical, racial or religious group."'" This has been one of the most controversial
aspects of the definition of genocide. Critics have complained
about the definition's limited scope and its exclusion of political
and other groups,7 2 proposed that it be amended to expand its
scope, 73 or argued that judges should impose a dynamic interpretation upon the provision. 4 Amendment has proven to be
out of the question. When States were given an opportunity to
revise the definition at the Rome Conference in June-July 1998,
they chose to reaffirm the text adopted by the General Assembly
of the United Nations some fifty years earlier.7 5 Some of the
70. See Prosecutor v.Jelisic, Case no. IT-95-10-T, Judgment (Dec. 14, 1999); Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Case no. IT-95-10-A, Judgment (July 5, 2001).
71. Statute, supra note 1, art. 4(2).
72. See Frank Chalk & Kurt Jonassohn, The Conceptual Framework, in THE HISTORY
AND SOCIOLOGY OF GENOCIDE 11 (Frank Chalk & KurtJonassohn eds., 1990).
73. See 2 PIETER NICOIAAS DROST, THE CRIME OF STATE: GENOCIDE 122-23 (1959).
74. See Lori Lyman Bruun, Beyond the 1948 Convention-EmergingPrinciples of Genocide in Customary InternationalLaw, 17 MD.J. INT'L L. & TRADE 193, 210-18 (1993); Beth
Van Schaack, The Crime of Political Genocide: Repairingthe Genocide Convention's Blind Spot,
106 YALE L.J. 2259, 2280-82 (1997).
75. See Report of the PreparatoryCommittee on the Establishment of an InternationalCriminal Court: Compilation ofProposals, U.N. GAOR, Preparatory Comm. on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 51st sess., U.N. Doc. A/51/22, Vol. I, para. 61
(1996).
There was a suggestion to expand the definition of the crime of genocide
contained in the Convention to encompass social and political groups. This
suggestion was supported by some delegations who felt that any gap in the
definition should be filled. However, other delegations expressed opposition
to amending the definition contained in the Convention, which was binding
on all States as a matter of customary law and which had been incorporated in
the implementing legislation of the numerous States parties to the Convention. The view was expressed that the amendment of existing conventions was
beyond the scope of the present exercise. Concern was also expressed that
providing for different definitions of the crime of genocide in the statute
could result in the International Court ofJustice and the international criminal court rendering conflicting decisions with respect to the same situation
under the two respective instruments. It was suggested that acts such as murder that could qualify as genocide when committed against one of the groups
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Trial Chamber decisions of the ICTR, vexed by how to categorize the Rwandan Tutsi minority, have ruled that the enumeration in the Convention definition of genocide should be interpreted so as to encompass any "stable and permanent" group.7 6
The ICTY considered the issue for the first time in Krstic.
Using a historical analysis, and relying on texts in similar human
rights instruments, the ICTY observed that the four categories
protected by the Convention correspond in large measure to
what other texts have designated "national minorities."
National, ethnical, racial or religious groups are not clearly
defined in the Convention or elsewhere. In contrast, the preparatory work on the Convention and the work conducted by
international bodies in relation to the protection of minorities show that the concepts of protected groups and national
minorities partially overlap and are on occasion synonymous.
European instruments on human rights use the term "national minorities," while universal instruments more commonly make reference to "ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities"; the two expressions appear to embrace the same
goals. In a study conducted for the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities in
1979, F. Capotorti commented that "the Sub-Commission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities decided, in 1950, to replace the word 'racial' by the word 'ethnic' in all references to minority groups described by their
ethnic origin." The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination defines racial
discrimination as "any distinction, exclusion, restriction or
preference based on race, color, descent, or national or ethnic origin." The preparatory work on the Genocide Convention also reflects that the term "ethnical "was added at a later
stage in order to better define the type of groups protected by
the Convention and ensure that the term "national" would
referred to in the Convention could also constitute crimes against humanity
when committed against members of other groups, including social or political groups.
Herman von Hebel & Darryl Robinson, Crimes Within the Jurisdictionof the Court, in THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE, ISSUES, NEGOTIA-

RESULTS 89 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999) (explaining that Egypt was the source of the
proposal).
76. See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case no. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, para. 516 (Sept. 2,
1998). Otherjudges of the ICTR have not endorsed this expansive interpretation, clasTIONS,

sifying the Tutsi as an "ethnic group" within the literal definition of genocide. See Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case no. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, para. 291 (May 21, 1999).
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77
not be understood as encompassing purely political groups.

Accordingly,
The preparatory work of the Convention shows that setting
out such a list was designed more to describe a single phenomenon, roughly corresponding to what were recognised,
before the second world war, as 'national minorities,' rather
than to refer to several distinct prototypes of human groups.
To attempt to differentiate each of the named groups on the
basis of scientifically objective criteria would thus be inconsis78
tent with the object and purpose of the Convention.
The targeted group, said the Trial Chamber, was "Bosnian Muslims."7 9
The Krstic Trial Chamber has struck an appropriate balance
in interpreting the provision. It avoids the narrow positivism of
an approach that focuses on individual definitions for the four
categories. At the same time, it respects the intent of the drafters, orienting genocide prosecution to the genuine object and
purpose of the Convention, which was to protect national minorities from attacks upon their right to existence. It is striking that
the Trial Chamber does not even allude to the case law of the
80
ICTR on this point.
A related question is whether the group is to be determined
according to objective or subjective criteria. The ICTR has been
split on this point, with some judgments supporting the view that
the group must have some objective existence,"' and others contending that it is the perpetrator who determines the existence
and definition of the group irrespective of objective considerations.8 2 The ICTY seems clearly to favor the subjective approach.
In Jelisic, the Trial Chamber said:
77. Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case no. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, para. 555 (Aug. 2, 2001)
(references omitted).
78. Id. para. 556.
79. Id. para. 560.
80. For a criticism of the ICTR's approach to the protected groups, see William A.
Schabas, L'affaire Akayesu, in G9NOCIDE(S) 111-20 (Katia Boustany & Daniel Dormoy
eds., 1999); William A. Schabas, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Commentary, in II ANNOTATED
LEADING CASES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA 1994-1999, at 539-54 (Andr6 Klip & Goran Sluiter eds., 2001).

See also Diane Marie Amann, Prosecutorv. Akayesu, 93 Am.J. INT'L L. 195 (1999).
Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case no. ICTR-96-3-T, Judgment, para. 57
81. See e.g.,
(Dec. 6, 1999).
82. See e.g., Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case no. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, para. 98
(May 21, 1999).
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Although the objective determination of a religious group
still remains possible, to attempt to define a national, ethnical
or racial group today using objective and scientifically irreproachable criteria would be a perilous exercise whose result
would not necessarily correspond to the perception of the
persons concerned by such categorisation. Therefore, it is
more appropriate to evaluate the status of a national, ethnical
or racial group from the point of view of those persons who
wish to single that group out from the rest of the community.
The Trial Chamber consequently elects to evaluate membership in a national, ethnical or racial group using a subjective
criterion. It is the stigmatisation of a group as a distinct national, ethnical or racial unit by the community which allows
it to be determined whether a targeted population constitutes
a national, ethnical or racial group in the eyes of the alleged
perpetrators.8s

These views were endorsed by another Trial Chamber in Krstic.s4
This approach is appealing up to a point, especially because
the perpetrator's intent is a decisive element in the crime of genocide. Its flaw is, at least in theory, allowing genocide to be

committed against a group that does not have any real objective
existence. To make an analogy with ordinary criminal law, many
penal codes stigmatize patricide, that is, the killing of one's parents. But the murderer who kills an individual believing, erroneously, that he or she is killing a parent, is only a murderer, not a

patricide. The same reasoning must apply to the crime genocide. Although helpful to an extent, the subjective approach
flounders because law cannot permit the crime to be defined by
the offender alone. It is necessary, therefore, to determine some
objective existence of the four groups. This issue may not be of

great practical significance, however. In the words of the former
High Commissioner on National Minorities of the Organization
for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Max van der Stoel, "I
86
5
know a minority when I see one." Judges will too.
83. Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Case no. IT-95-10-T, Judgment, para. 70 (Dec. 14, 1999).
84. See Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case no. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, para. 557 (Aug. 2,

2001).
85. Max van der Stoel, Prevention ofMinority Conflicts, in THE CSCE AND
NEW EUROPE 148 (L.B. Sohn ed., 1993).

THE

TuRBu-

LENT

86. See id. Van der Stoel's comment was inspired by a judge, United States Su-

preme Court Justice Potter Stewart, who had said the same thing about pornography.
SeeJacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1963).
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III. DO NUMBERS MATTER? "IN WHOLE OR IN PART"
There has been much confusion about the requirement in
the definition of genocide that the group be destroyed "in whole
or in part.'"87 These terms appear in the chapeau of the definition and refer to the genocidal intent. Thus, the reference is not
to the physical act, as if there must be some quantitative threshold where mass murder turns into genocide, but rather the intent of the perpetrators. The actual result, in terms of quantity,
will nevertheless be relevant in that it assists the trier of fact to
draw conclusions about intent based on the behavior of the offender. The greater the number of actual victims, the more
plausible becomes the deduction that the perpetrators intended
to destroy the group, in whole or in part.
This still does not resolve the problem of construing the
meaning of the term "in part." Could it be genocidal to target
only a few persons for murder because of their membership in a
particular ethnic group? A literal reading of the definition
would seem to support such an interpretation. Nevertheless, this
construction is absurd, and totally incompatible with the drafting history, the context, and the object and purpose of the Convention.
The authorities have added a gloss to the definition, requiring that the intended destruction be of a "substantial" part of the
group. One of first academic writers on the subject, Nehemiah
Robinson, said the real point of the provision is to encompass
genocide where it is directed against a part of a country, or a
single town. 8 Genocide is aimed at destroying "a multitude of
persons of the same group," as long as the number is "substan89
tial."
[T] he intention must be to destroy a group and not merely
one or more individuals who are coincidentally members of a
particular group. The prohibited act must be committed
against an individual because of his membership in a particular group and as an incremental step in the overall objective
of destroying the group. It is the membership of the individ87. See Convention, supra note 1, art. 4(2).
88. See

NEHEMIAH ROBINSON,

THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION:

A

COMMENTARY

63

(1959).
89. Id. But the adjective "substantial" appears earlier, in submissions by Raphael
Lemkin to the United States Congress. See 2 Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, Historical Series 370 (1976).
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ual in a particular group rather than the identity of the individual that is the decisive criterion in determining the immediate victims of the crime of genocide. The group itself is the
ultimate target or intended victim of this type of massive criminal conduct.9 0
The International Law Commission considered that "[i]t is not
necessary to intend to achieve the complete annihilation of a
group from every corner of the globe. None the less the crime
of genocide by its very nature requires the intention to destroy at
least a substantial part of a particular group."9 1 Similarly, the
final draft statute of the Preparatory Committee of the International Criminal Court noted that "[t]he reference to 'intent to
destroy, in whole or in part.., a group, as such' was understood
to refer to the specific intention to destroy more than a small
number of individuals who are members of a group."9 2 The
ICTR, in Prosecutorv. Kayishema, said "that 'in part' requires the
intention to destroy a considerable number of individuals. '9 3 In
Prosecutorv. Jelisic, the ICTY said that genocide must involve the
intent to destroy a "substantial" part, although not necessarily a
"very important part.""
That genocide may be directed against a group within a very
limited region has been readily accepted by the ICTY. It has
tended to focus its analysis on municipalities or regions, rather
than on Bosnia or the former Yugoslavia taken as a whole. In
Jelisic, the Trial Chamber held that "international custom admits
the characterization of genocide even when the exterminatory
intent only extends to a limited geographic zone."9 5 Similarly, in
Prosecutor v. Krstic, the Trial Chamber said:
The Trial Chamber is therefore of the opinion that the intent
to destroy a group, even if only in part, means seeking to destroy a distinct part of the group as opposed to an accumula90. Commission Report, supra note 59, art. 17 Commentary 6.
91. Id. art. 17 Commentary 8.
92. Report of the PreparatoryCommittee on the Establishment of an InternationalCriminal
Court, Draft Statutefor the InternationalCriminalCourt, Jurisdiction,Admissibility and Applicable Law, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/2/Add.1, at 11 n.1 (1998), availableat http://www.un.
org/law/n9810105.pdf.
93. Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case no. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, para. 97 (May 21,
1999).
94. Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Case no. IT-95-10-T, Judgment (Oct. 19, 1999).
95. Jelisic, Case no. IT-95-10-T, para. 83 (Dec. 14, 1999); see Prosecutor v. Sikirica,
Case no. IT-95-8-I, Judgment on Defence Motions to Acquit, para. 68 (Sept. 3, 2001).
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tion of isolated individuals within it. Although the perpetrators of genocide need not seek to destroy the entire group
protected by the Convention, they must view the part of the
group they wish to destroy as a distinct entity which must be
eliminated as such. A campaign resulting in the killings, in
different places spread over a broad geographical area, of a
finite number of members of a protected group might not
thus qualify as genocide, despite the high total number of casualties, because it would not show an intent by the perpetrators to target the very existence of the group as such. Conversely, the killing of all members of the part of a group located within a small geographical area, although resulting in
a lesser number of victims, would qualify as genocide if carried out with the intent to destroy the part of the group as
such located in this small geographical area. Indeed, the
physical destruction may target only a part of the geographically limited part of the larger group because the perpetrators
of the genocide regard the intended destruction as sufficient
to annihilate the group as a distinct entity in the geographic
area at issue. In this regard, it is important to bear in mind
the total context in which the physical destruction is carried
96
out.

In Prosecutorv. Sikirica, the ICTY looked at the numbers in
detail, noting that in the Keraterm camp the inmate population
represented at most 2 to 2.8% of the Bosnian Muslims of the
Prijedor region. 9 While admitting that this did not definitively
establish whether or not the perpetrators of killings in the camp
had the intent to destroy a broader number, the judges said,
"when that fact is considered along with other aspects of the evidence, it becomes clear that this is not a case in which the intent
to destroy a substantial number of Bosnian Muslims or Bosnian
Croats can properly be inferred."9 "
Although the concept of genocide on a limited geographic
scale seems perfectly compatible with the object and purpose of
the Convention, it does raise questions relating to the plan or
policy issue. Localized genocide may tend to suggest the absence of a plan or policy on a national level, and while it may
result in convictions of low-level officials within the municipality
or region, it may also create a presumption that the crime was
96. Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case no. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, para. 590 (Aug. 2, 2001).

97. See Sikirica, Case no. IT-95-8-I, para. 72.
98. Id. para. 75.
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not in fact organized on a larger scale. In Rwanda, this problem
does not really arise. The Prosecutor's case began with general
evidence about the genocidal plan on a national scale, presented
by expert witnesses, and this has been echoed in the judgments.9 9 A major part of the first important judgment of the
ICTR is entitled "Genocide in Rwanda in 1994?"10 Yet no similar discussion appears in any of the judgments of the ICTY to
date. In fact, the Prosecutor has not developed the same type of
argument before the ICTY, insisting instead on the local context.
Accordingly, before the ICTY, the Prosecutor has argued
that:
In view of the particular intent requirement, which is the essence of the crime of genocide, the relative proportionate
scale of the actual or attempted physical destruction of a
group, or a significant section thereof, should be considered
in relation to the factual opportunity of the accused to destroy a group in a specific geographic area within the sphere
population of
of his control, and not in relation to the10entire
1
the group in a wider geographic sense.
It has been argued that the protected group may be defined
qualitatively as well as quantitatively or, in other words, that a
"significant" rather than a "substantial" part of the group must
be targeted. This approach to the definition of genocide surfaced in the report of the Commission of Experts established by
the Security Council in 1992 to investigate violations of international humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia. According to
one of its members, Professor Cherif Bassiouni, the Commission
considered the definition in the Convention to be "sufficiently
pliable to encompass not only the targeting of an entire group,
as stated in the convention, but also the targeting of certain segments of a given group, such as the Muslim elite or Muslim women."10 2 The Commission stated:
If essentially the total leadership of a group is targeted, it
99. See e.g., Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case no. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, paras. 112-29
(Sept. 2, 1998).
100. Id.
101. Prosecutor v. Karadzic, Case nos. IT-95-18-R61, IT-95-5-R61, Transcript of
hearing, at 15-16 (June 27, 1996).
102. M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security
Council Resolution 780: Investigating Violations of InternationalHumanitarian Law in the
Former Yugoslavia, 5 CRIM. L. FORUM 279, 323 (1994).
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could also amount to genocide. Such leadership includes political and administrative leaders, religious leaders, academics
and intellectuals, business leaders and others-the totality
per se may be a strong indication of genocide regardless of
the actual numbers killed. A corroborating argument will be
the fate of the rest of the group. The character of the attack
on the leadership must be viewed in the context of the fate or
what happened to the rest of the group. If a group has its
leadership exterminated, and at the same time or in the wake
of that, has a relatively large number of the members of the
group killed or subjected to other heinous acts, for example
deported on a large scale or forced to flee, the cluster of violations ought to be considered in its entirety in order to interpret the provisions3 of the Convention in a spirit consistent
0
with its purpose.
The Trial Chamber in Jelisic discussed this approach when it reviewed the arguments of the Prosecutor. 10 4 According to the
Trial Chamber, it might be possible to infer the requisite genocidal intent from the "desired destruction of a more limited number of persons selected for the impact that their disappearance
1 °5
Ultiwould have upon the survival of the group as such."'
mately, it found it was not possible "to conclude beyond all reasonable doubt that the choice of victims arose from a precise
logic to destroy the most representative figures of the Muslim
community in Brcko to the point of threatening the survival of
'0 6
that community."'
The same scenario of relatively small numbers of killings in
concentration camps returned in Sikirica, but again, the judges
could not discern any pattern in the camp killings that suggested
the intent to destroy a "significant" part of the local Muslim com-

103. Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council
Resolution 780 (1992), U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674, para. 94 (1994) [hereinafter
Expert Report]. The idea that "in part" referred to a "significant part" can be traced to
the special rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Human Rights, Benjamin Whitaker.
See Benjamin Whitaker, Revised and Updated Report on the Question of the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/6, at 16, para. 29
(1985).
104. See Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Case no. IT-95-10-T, Judgment, para. 82 (Dec. 14,
1999).
105. Id.
106. Id. para. 93.
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munity so as to threaten its survival.1 07 The victims were butchers, cafe owners, lawyers, pilots, schoolteachers, and taxi-drivers
The Trial Chamber
but not, apparently, community leaders.'
observed that "they do not appear to have been persons with any
special significance to their community, except to the extent that
some of them were of military age, and therefore could be called
up for military service."'0 9
The test, then, using the "significant group" approach, is
whether the destruction of a social strata threatens the group's
survival as a whole. In Jelisic, these were "representative figures."
In Sikirica, they were community leaders. But in Krstic, where
the victims were men and boys of military age, there was no real
suggestion that they were community leaders or representative
figures. Indeed, it would seem likely that the leaders of the community would be men above military age. There was unchallenged evidence that General Krstic had organized the transfer
of women, children, and the elderly from the Srebrenica area so
that they would not be affected by the coming holocaust." 0 Did
General Krstic also transfer the wise old leaders of the community? The judgment doesn't say.
The "significant part" approach inevitably leads to speculation about what the killing of one or another strata in a community will do to its survival. Perhaps killing the "leaders" will do
the trick. But somebody bent upon destroying a group might
more logically focus on the children, or the women, as they ensure the group's survival. And this results in value judgments
about how important one or another group may be to the survival of the community. In Krstic, the Prosecutor had argued
that "what remains of the Srebrenica community survives in
many cases only in the biological sense, nothing more. It's a
community in despair; it's a community clinging to memories;
it's a community that is lacking leadership; it's a community
that's a shadow of what it once was.""' And yet the alleged intent of the perpetrators-this is really unchallenged in the judg107. See Prosecutor v. Sikirica, Case no. IT-95-8-I,Judgment on Defence Motions to
Acquit, para. 80 (Aug. 3, 2001).
108. See id.
109. Id.
110. See Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case no. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, para. 609 (Aug. 2,
2001).
111. Id. para. 592.
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ment-was to "ethnically cleanse" the region of Muslims, not to
destroy the group in a physical sense.1 12 The Trial Chamber appeared to accept the Prosecutor's contention that the intent in
killing the men and boys of military age was to eliminate the
1 13
community as a whole.
This seems a rather enormous deduction to make on the
basis that men and boys of military age were massacred. Can
there not be other plausible explanations for the destruction of
7,000 men and boys in Srebrenica? Could they not have been
targeted precisely because they were of military age, and thus actual or potential combatants? Would someone truly bent upon
the physical destruction of a group, and cold-blooded enough to
murder more than 7,000 defenseless men and boys, go to the
trouble of organizing transport so that women, children, and the
elderly could be evacuated? It is certainly striking that another
Trial Chamber, in Sikirica, dismissed the "significant part" argument after noting that the common denominator of the victims
was that they were men of military age and nothing more, as if
14
this were insufficient.
Here is the explanation provided by the Trial Chamber in
Krstic:
Granted, only the men of military age were systematically
massacred, but it is significant that these massacres occurred
at a time when the forcible transfer of the rest of the Bosnian
Muslim population was well under way. The Bosnian Serb
forces could not have failed to know, by the time they decided to kill all the men, that this selective destruction of the
group would have a lasting impact upon the entire group.
Their death precluded any effective attempt by the Bosnian
Muslims to recapture the territory. Furthermore, the Bosnian
Serb forces had to be aware of the catastrophic impact that
the disappearance of two or three generations of men would
have on the survival of a traditionally patriarchal society, an
impact the Chamber has previously described in detail. The
Bosnian Serb forces knew, by the time they decided to kill all
of the military aged men, that the combination of those killings with the forcible transfer of the women, children and
elderly would inevitably result in the physical disappearance
112. See id.
113. See id. para. 594.
114. See Sikirica, Case no. IT-95-8-I, para. 81.
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of the Bosnian Muslim population at Srebrenica.1 1 5
There is a world of difference between physical destruction
of a group and "a lasting impact" upon a community. If the intent of the Serb forces was to have a "lasting impact" on Srebrenica's Muslims, then they did not intend to destroy the community. The classic genocides of the twentieth century, those of European Jews and Rwandan Tutsis, are distinguished by the
insistence upon killing the women and children, precisely to ensure that the group is effectively destroyed. But the issue is not
whether the massacre of the men and boys of military age was
really effective in destroying the Srebrenica Muslims. The crime
of genocide does not require a result, and courts need not determine whether the actual method was well chosen. Still, to the
extent that the genocidal technique is incomplete and perhaps
illogical, this will cast doubts on whether or not real genuine
intent was present. As "crimes against humanity," the atrocities
of July 1995 in Srebrenica surely qualify. But categorizing them
as "genocide" seems to distort the definition unreasonably.
IV. "SPECIFICINTENT" OR DOLUS SPECIALIS
Judgments of the ICTY and the ICTR have helped to complicate the issue of genocidal intent by using the terms dolus
specialis1t 6 and "special intent"11 7 to describe the particular
mental element or mens rea of the crime of genocide, despite the
fact that the mental element or mens rea is already set out within
the definition itself.1 1 In Prosecutorv. Kambanda the ICTR Trial
Chamber observed: "The crime of genocide is unique because
of its element of dolus specialis (special intent) which requires
that the crime be committed with the intent 'to destroy in whole
115. Krstic, Case no.IT-98-33-T, para. 595 (reference omitted).
Finally, the Trial Chamber has concluded that, in terms of the requirement of
Article 4(2) of the Statute that an intent to destroy only part of the group must
nevertheless concern a substantial part thereof, either numerically or qualitatively, the military aged Bosnian Muslim men of Srebrenica do in fact constitute a substantial part of the Bosnian Muslim group, because the killing of
these men inevitably and fundamentally would result in the annihilation of
the entire Bosnian Muslim community at Srebrenica.
Id. para. 634.
116. See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case no. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, paras. 122, 498,
499, 517, 540 (Sept. 2 1998).
117. Id. paras. 498, 499, 510, 517, 518, 544, 568.
118. See Statute, supra note 1.
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or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group as
such'."' 1 9 In Jelisic, the ICTY Trial Chamber used the expression
only once, in what is essentially a concluding paragraph of the
December 14 judgment: "The Trial Chamber therefore concludes that it has not been proved beyond all reasonable doubt
that the accused was motivated by the dolus specialis of the crime
of genocide."12 1 In explanation, the Trial Chamber said "he
killed arbitrarily rather than with the clear intention to destroy a
group."'21
The issue was raised by the Office of the Prosecutor on appeal in the Jelisic case. 1 22 For the Prosecutor, the concept of dolus specialis set too high a standard, and could not be equated
with the common law concepts of "specific intent" or "special
intent.' 12 The Appeals Chamber dealt with the matter rather
laconically, saying simply that the Trial Chamber had used the
term dolus specialisas if it meant "specific intent.' ' 24 The Appeals
Chamber used the term "specific intent" to describe "the intent
to destroy in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such," or, in other words, the normative require15
ment set out in the chapeau of the definition of genocide.
The definition requires that the accused commit one of five
punishable acts, of which "killing" sits at the top of the list and is
arguably the most serious. 26 Obviously, the accused must have
the intent to commit the act of "killing." In the common law
system, "killing" simpliciter is a crime of "specific intent," in that
the accused may rebut a charge with evidence that he or she
lacked the "specific" intent to murder, for example because of
voluntary intoxication.' 27 The result is acquittal of the crime of
murder but conviction for the lesser and included crime of manslaughter or involuntary homicide, itself a crime of "general in119. Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR 97-23-S, Judgment and Sentence,
para. 16 (Sept. 4, 1998).

120. Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Case no. IT-95-10-T, Judgment, para. 108 (Dec. 14,
1999).
121. Id.
122. Jelisic, Case no. IT-95-10-A, Prosecution's Appeal Brief (Redacted Version),
para. 4.22 (July 14, 2000).
123. See id.; see generally Prosecutor v. Sikirica, Case no. IT-95-8-T, Judgment on
Defense Motions to Acquit, para. 27 (Sept. 3, 2001).
124. SeeJelisic, Case no. IT-95-10-A, Judgment, para. 51 (July 5, 2001).
125. See id. para. 45.
126. See Statute, supra note 1, art. 4(2)(a).
127. See Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions. v. Beard, [1920] A.C. 479 (H.L.).
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tent." But for "killing" to constitute the crime of genocide, it
in
must be accompanied by the "intent to destroy, in whole or 128
such.
as
group
religious
or
racial
ethnical,
part, a national,
This presumably is all that is meant by the dolus specialis, or the
special intent, or the specific intent of the crime of genocide.
But it would probably be preferable to eschew importation
of enigmatic concepts like dolus specialis or "specific intent" from
national systems of criminal law. They seem valuable only to the
extent that they recall what can in any case be gleaned from the
plain words of the definition of the international crime of genocide. The Sikirica Trial Chamber accused the Prosecutor of unnecessarily complicating matters by introducing a debate about
theories of intent, noting that the matter should be resolved with
reference to the text of the provision:
The first rule of interpretation is to give words their ordinary
meaning where the text is clear. Here, the meaning of intent
is made plain in the chapeau to Article 4(2). Beyond saying
that the very specific intent required must be established, particularly in the light of the potential for confusion between
genocide and persecution, the Chamber does not consider it
necessary to indulge in the exercise of choosing one of the
three standards identified by the Prosecution. In the light,
therefore, of the explanation that the provision itself gives as
it is unnecessary to have
to the specific meaning of intent,
29
recourse to theories of intent.'
In its commentary on the 1996 Code of Crimes Against the
Peace and Security of Mankind, the International Law Commission qualified genocide's specific intent as "the distinguishing
characteristic of this particular crime under international
law."

13 0

The prohibited acts enumerated in subparagraphs (a) to (e)
are by their very nature conscious, intentional or volitional
acts which an individual could not usually commit without
knowing that certain consequences were likely to result.
These are not the type of acts that would normally occur by
accident or even as a result of mere negligence. However, a
general intent to commit one of the enumerated acts com128. Statute, supra note 1, art. 4(2).
129. Prosecutor v. Sikirica, Case no. IT-95-8-T, Judgment on Defence Motions to
Acquit, para. 60 (Sept. 3, 2001) (references omitted).
130. Commission Report, supra note 59, art. 17 Commentary 5.
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bined with a general awareness of the probable consequences
of such an act with respect to the immediate victim or victims
is not sufficient for the crime of genocide. The definition of
this crime requires a particular state of mind or a specific intent with respect to the overall consequences of the prohibited act.'

Krstic demonstrates the practical consequences of the Appeals
Chamber's pronouncement on the mental element of genocide
in Jelisic. Evidence showed that General Krstic participated in a
common criminal enterprise involving the destruction of Bosnian Muslim men and boys of military age. Although he organized the evacuation of women, children, and the elderly, he also
participated in the subsequent operations, and these involved
the summary executions. There was no evidence that he either
killed personally the Muslim men or boys, that he was present
when they were killed, or that he ordered their killing. Nevertheless, as a participant in the overall military operation, the
Trial Chamber considered it sufficient that he had knowledge
that extermination was being carried out. 13 2 But even here,
there was no direct evidence of his knowledge of the mass killings. Nevertheless, "General Krstic could only surmise that the
original objective of ethnic cleansing by forcible transfer had
turned into a lethal plan to destroy the male population of
Srebrenica once and for all."133 Indeed, Krstic was commander,
both de facto and de jure, of the Drina Corps, which "rendered
tangible and substantial assistance and technical support to the
detention, killing and burial" of the victims.1'3 The Trial Chamber seems to have presumed that General Krstic knew of the summary executions.
This is certainly a mental element that falls shy of the standard of dolus specialis in continental law systems. Nevertheless, it
would appear consistent with the text of the definition, to the
extent that General Krstic had knowledge of the plan to destroy
the Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica and participated actively in
it. One interesting result of the Krstic Trial Chamber's analysis
concerns the concept of command responsibility, which is set
131.
132.
2, 2001).
133.
134.

Id.
See Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case no. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, para. 624, 644 (Aug.
Id. para. 622.
Id. para. 624.
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out in article 7(3) of the ICTY Statute.' 3 5 Krstic might have been
convicted on the basis of this evidence. The Trial Chamber
opted for the more demanding route, 1 36 however, in effect
presuming that he commanded his troops to participate in the
massacres, although nowhere does it state this explicitly. Still, if
he is convicted qua commander because his troops actually carried out what the Trial Chamber deems to be genocidal acts,
then it is because he gave the orders, and not because his troops
carried out acts that he ought to have known about, that is, the
scenario contemplated command responsibility. It is a bold decision, based on circumstantial evidence and presumptions, but
one that is far more satisfying from the standpoint of criminal
law theory than a discounted conviction relying only upon proof
of negligence.
Accordingly, the issue of whether or not genocide can actually be convicted on the basis of command responsibility still remains to be decided. After all, the knowledge requirement of
command responsibility ("had reason to know") is an objective
negligence standard that manifestly falls short of the "specific
intent" required by the chapeau of the genocide provision. And
yet article 7(3) of the ICTY Statute clearly contemplates this apparently contradictory hypothesis, namely that a person who
only "had reason to know" also had the intent to destroy a pro37
tected group.1
CONCLUSION
It is now nearly a decade since international justice began
examining whether genocide was committed in Bosnia. Astonishingly, the really big question-and the most interesting one
from a political and historical standpoint-still remains unanswered, namely whether there was an organized plan or policy
on the part of the Bosnian Serb leadership, with the complicity
of the Belgrade regime, to destroy the Bosnian Muslims within
the meaning of article II of the Convention. The ICJ, seized of
the matter in March 1993, has yet to adjudicate the question on
the merits.'
Given the sluggish pace of the case-allegedly due
135.
136.
137.
138.

See Statute, supra note 1, art. 7(3).
Krstic, Case no. IT-98-33-T, para. 605.
See Statute, supra note 1, art. 7(3).
See Application, supra note 8.
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to political stalemates within the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina-a final judgment may never be issued.13 9 As for the
criminal trials before the ICTY, they too have so far been indecisive.
To date, the Tribunal has addressed two types of cases. The
first might be called the "camp cases," in that they concern persecution of members of ethnic minorities within the concentration camps that proliferated in Bosnia and Herzegovina during
the 1992-1995 war. Even under the Nazis, only a minority of the
concentration camps were actually extermination camps. The
Prosecutor appears to have made a mechanistic equation between concentration camps and genocide, but has been unable
to get a conviction after two attempts. The second category of
cases deals with the massacre at Srebrenica in July 1995. The
Krstic conviction, if upheld on appeal, will impact upon other
cases relating to the same atrocity. For example, Karadzic and
Mladic have been indicted for genocide with respect to Srebrenica,14 and a similar result to that in Krstic is to be anticipated if
they are ever brought to book. Yet Srebrenica remains an exceptional case. Indeed, that is how the Prosecutor presented it, focusing on the possibility of genocide being committed on a narrow regional scale.
The third category of genocide indictment is by far the most
significant. This category deals with the policy of the Bosnian
Serb leadership. Indictments of this type have been issued
" ' as well as against other Bosnian
against Karadzic and Mladic, 14
Serb supremos like Biljana Plavsic. 14 2 If the Prosecutor is to
make good her pledge to prosecute Milosevic for genocide, she
will almost certainly have to link him to this third category of
genocide. None of the existing judgments on genocide is of any
assistance to the Prosecutor in this respect. The acquittals of Jelisic and Sikirica in the "camp cases" suggest that no genocidal
139. Two other types of applications based upon the Convention are also pending
before the ICJ, by Yugoslavia against several NATO powers relating to the bombing
campaign in 1999, and by Croatia against Yugoslavia dealing with ethnic cleansing in
the Knin region, eastern and western Slavonia, and Dalmatia. See International Court
of Justice, Current Docket of the Court, available at http://www.ic.law.gla.ac.uk/
icjwww/idocket.htm.
140. See Prosecutor v. Karadzic, Case no. IT-95-18, Indictment (Nov. 14, 1995).
141. See id.
142. See Prosecutor v. Krajisnik, Case no. IT-00-39 & 40-PT, Consolidated indictment (Feb. 23, 2001).
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pattern can be established there. As for Srebrenica, circumstantial proof or evidentiary presumptions may have been enough
for General Krstic, who was present and who commanded operational troops, but this can hardly be enough to make the link
with the authorities in Belgrade.

